Contents: Emptiness Appraised: A Critical Study of Nagarjuna's Philosophy
	Preface	ix
	Abbreviations	xiii
1	Introduction	1
	The Purpose of this Study	1
	Three Readings of Nagarjuna's Philosophy	2
	Some General Reflections on the Interpretation of Nagurjuna	5
	The Philosophical Study of Madhyamaka	11
	The Problem of Authorship	13
	Part I	17
2	Nagarjuna and Scepticism	19
	Introduction	19
	The Nature of Scepticism	20
	Scepticism, Negative Dogmatism, and Positive Dogmatism	21
	The Scope of Scepticism	21
	Undogmatic and Dogmatic Global Scepticism	22
	Present Global Scepticism and the Future	23
	Classical Scepticism	23
	Isosthenia and epoche in Classical Scepticism	24
	Academic and Pyrrhonian Scepticism	27
	Nagarjuna Interpreted as a Sceptic	30
	A Refutation of the Sceptical Interpretation	34
	Nagarjuna's Knowledge-Claim	34
	A Non-Sceptical Reading of MMK XIII, 8	37
	A Non-Sceptical Reading of YS 50-51	38
	The Non-Sceptical Purpose of Nagarjuna's Method of Argumentation	39
3	Non-Conceptuality and Knowledge of Reality	45
	Introduction	45
	Conceptualizability and Expressibility	48
	Interpretation (1): Non-Conceptual Knowledge of an Unconceptualizable Reality	49
	The Unconceptualizable Reality - Immanent or Transcendent?	52
	Is Interpretation (1) Supported By Textual Evidence?	53
	A Philosophical Critique of Interpretation	55
	The Paradox of Unconceptualizability and Ineffability	55
	The Problem of the Two Truths	57
	The Night In Which All Cows are Black	62
	S. Katz, etc on Non-Conceptual Religious Knowledge	64
	Concluding Philosophical Reflections on Interpretation (1)	65
	Interpretation (2): The Non-Conceptual Meditative Knowledge Experience of Emptiness	66
	Knowledge of Reality Versus the Reality Which is Known	68
	Knowledge of Reality is an Experience	69
	A Short Digression. The Private Nature of Experience	70
	(1) Knowledge by Acquaintance	73
	(2) Lack of Explicit Conceptualization	77
	(3) Focussed Conceptualization	79
	Concluding Remarks on and Criticisms of Interpretation (2)	81
	The Problem of Emtiness as a Mere Absence	82
	Interpretation (2) and the Question of Nihilism	83
4.	The Problem of Nihilism	87
	Introduction: The Charge of Nihilism and Nagarjuna's Response	87
	The Abhidharma Notion of svabbhava	90
	Nargujana's Notion of nibsvabbhava Understood in the Abhidharma Context	92
	A Terminological Difference	92
	Universal Absence of svabbhava as Equivalent to prajnaptimatra	93
	Evidence for prajnaptimatra in Nagarjuna's Writings	95
	Dependence on Parts	95
	'Samvrti' and 'samvrta' in the AS	96
	'Samvrti' and 'vyavahara' in MMK XXIV	96
	Synonyms for prajnaptimatra	97
	The Non-Origination of Dependently Originating Entities	98
	Comparisons with Dreams, Illusions, etc	99
	MMK XXIV, 18: An Analysis	101
	Prajnaptimatra and karma	104
	Prajnaptimatra and the Possibility of a Public World	107
	The Nihilistic Consequences of prajnaptimatra	109
	An Alternative Reading	111
	Textual Difficulties	113
	A Philosophical Problem	114
	Conclusion	116
	Part II	123
5	The Purpose of Part II	125
6	The Nyaya Pramana Theory	127
	Introduction	127
	Cognition (Jnana)	130
	Cognition in the NS	130
	The Developed Nyaya Theory of Cognition	131
	Pramana-s	133
	Pramaya-s	135
	Nyaya Realism	136
7	Nagarjuna's Non-Apprehension of Entities	141
	The Opponent's Objection at VV/VVC 5-6	141
	Nagarjuna's Response at VV/VV C 30	142
8	Mutally Dependent Existence	145
	Nagarjuna's Position	145
	Mutual Dependence and nibsvabbava	146
	A Critical Analysis of Nagarjuna's Position	147
9.	The Attack on Validation: Introduction	151
	Nagarjuna's Challenge to the Realist	151
	The Purpose of Nagarjuna's Attack	152
	The Theories of Validation Refuted by Nagarjuna	154
	The Validation of Knowledge-episodes Versus the Reflexivity of Consciousness	155
10	The Attack on Intrinsic Validation	157
	Intrinsic Validation (1): The pramana-s are Validated by Other pramana-s	157
	Nagarjuna's Refutation of Intrinsic Validation (1)	158
	A Solution to the Infinite Regress Problem	158
	Intrinsic Validation (2): The pramana-s are Self-Evident	160
	The Fire/lamp Analogy	161
	Nagarjuna's Refutation of Intrinsic Validation (2)	162
	Critical Analysis of Nagarjuna's Five Arguments	166
	Some Further Reflections on Self-Evident Knowledge-episodes	172
	An argument Against Both Intrinsic Validation (1) and (2)	175
11	The Attack on Extrinsic Validation	181
	Extrinsic Validation (1): The pramana-s are Validated by the prameya-s	181
	Nagarjuna's Refutation of Extrinsic Validation (1)	183
	Extrinsic Validation (2): Pramana-s and prameya-s are Mutually Validating	186
	Nagarjuna's Refutation of Extrinsic Validation (2)	186
	A Reply to Nagarjuna's Refutation	186
12	The Attack on Validation: Conclusion	189
13	The Argument from the Three times	191
	Analysis of the Argument	191
	The Naiyayika Objection	194
	Nagarjuna's Response to the Naiyayika Objection	195
	Another Madhyamika Response Considered	196
14	Further Arguments in the Vaidalyaprakarana	201
	The Analysis of the Perception of a Pot	201
	Refutation of the pramana as a Cognition which Corresponds to the Object as prameya	204
	The Object Cognized is Just a Condition of the Knowledge-episode	204
	The Cognition is a prameya, According to the Naiyayikas Themselves	206
15	Conclusion	209
	Appendix: Some Further Reflections on Svabbhava in Indian Madhyamaka	213
	Candrakirti's Claim that the Actual svabbhava of Entities is Their Lack of svabbhava	213
	Adumbrations of Candrakirti's View in Nagarjuna's Writings	214
	A gzhan stong Interpretation of AS 44-45b	218
	Bibliography	221
	Index	228